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Charitable contributions are frequently made over time. Donors
are free to contribute whenever they wish and as often as they want,
and are frequently updated on the level of contributions by others. A
dynamic structure enables donors to condition their contribution on
that of others, and, as Schelling (1960) suggested, it may establish
trust thereby increasing charitable giving. Marx and Matthews (2000)
build on Schelling’s insight and show that multiple contribution rounds
may secure a provision level that cannot be achieved in the static, one-
shot setting, but only if there is a discrete, positive payoﬀ jump upon
completion of the project. We examine these two hypotheses experi-
mentally using static and dynamic public good games. We ﬁnd that
contributions are indeed higher in the dynamic than in the static game.
However, in contrast to the predictions, the increase in contributions
in the dynamic game does not depend critically on the existence of
ac o m p l e t i o nb e n e ﬁt jump or on whether players can condition their
decisions on the behavior of other members of their group.
Keywords: Dynamic Public Goods Game, Voluntary Contribution Mech-
anism, Information, Reciprocity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Theoretical analysis of voluntary contribution games suggests that free-rider
problems will hinder the ﬁnancing of public goods. Nevertheless, some public
goods are, in fact, ﬁnanced through voluntary contributions. This observa-
tion has led to a voluminous experimental literature aimed at understanding
the factors that inﬂuence the level of contributions observed in voluntary
contribution games.1 This paper contributes to this literature by examin-
ing whether it may be easier to overcome free-riding when contributions are
made in a dynamic as opposed to a static game environment.
In a static game, each player makes a single contribution decision and
that decision must be made without knowledge of the decisions made by
others. By contrast, in a dynamic game, players make decisions in multiple
rounds and may condition each decision upon the level of total contributions
in the previous round, a state-variable that is periodically updated.
There is good reason to think that charitable giving is best viewed as a
dynamic rather than a static game. Certainly, most charities do not require
that contributions be made at a single date in time — rather, fund-drives
typically last for some duration of time, and a target goal is set in advance.
Further, charities ﬁnd it useful to periodically update potential donors on
the level of contributions received during the fund-drive. For instance, the
United Way is fond of using “thermometers” showing progress made during
a campaign toward the target goal.
Why might contribution decisions diﬀer in a dynamic setting, with mul-
tiple contribution opportunities, as opposed to static setting, with a single
contribution opportunity? Schelling (1960) suggested one possibility: dy-
namic environments allow for smaller, history-contingent contributions that
aid in the establishment of trust. Speciﬁcally, Schelling writes (1960, pp.
45-6):
“Even if the future will bring no recurrence, it may be possible to
create the equivalence of continuity by dividing the bargaining
issue into consecutive parts. If each party agrees to send a mil-
lion dollars to the Red Cross on condition the other does, each
may be tempted to cheat if the other contributes ﬁrst, and each
one’s anticipation of the other’s cheating will inhibit agreement.
But if the contribution is divided into consecutive small contri-
butions, each can try the other’s good faith for a small price.
Furthermore, since each can keep the other on short tether to
1See Ledyard (1995) for a survey.
1the ﬁnish, no one ever need risk more than one small contribu-
tion at a time. Finally, this change in the incentive structure
itself takes most of the risk out of the initial contribution; the
value of established trust is made obviously visible...”2
Marx and Matthews (2000) build on Schelling’s insight regarding the
importance of history dependent contributions, and develop a theory of how
agents might complete funding of a public good in a ﬁnite horizon game.
They show that if agents are payoﬀ maximizers, the equilibria of the multi-
ple contribution-round (dynamic) ﬁnite game will diﬀer from the one-round
(static) game only if a discrete beneﬁt ‘jump’ is realized upon completion
of the public good project. In particular, in the presence of a beneﬁt jump,
dynamic play may sustain equilibria that complete the public good (via
history-dependent trigger strategies),e v e nw h e nn os u c he q u i l i b r i ae x i s ti n
the static, one-round version of the game.
A discrete completion beneﬁt arises when the full beneﬁts of a project
are not experienced until the project is completed. For example, contri-
butions to the homeless may have some immediate beneﬁcial eﬀect, but a
substantial and discrete increase in beneﬁts from contributions may not be
achieved until suﬃcient funds have been collected to build a homeless shel-
ter. Similarly, a completed collection of paintings may result in a larger
overall beneﬁt than the sum of the beneﬁts associated with each individual
painting. Public radio fund-raising campaigns that promise to end early if
their target is reached before the drive is over provide an endogenous and
discrete completion beneﬁt.
In this paper we report on a laboratory experiment designed to investi-
gate these two theories. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether voluntary contributions
diﬀer when the contribution game is dynamic rather than static, and if so,
whether the diﬀerences are owing to the mechanisms suggested by Schelling
and Marx and Matthews. Consistent with their hypotheses, we compare be-
havior when individuals with a given endowment simultaneously contribute
in either one or multiple contribution rounds. In the presence of a com-
pletion beneﬁt, greater giving in the dynamic than static games would be
consistent with both Schelling and Marx and Matthews. To distinguish
2While Schelling may have been the ﬁrst to write about this possibility, the practice
of soliciting small contributions over time with feedback on the historical contributions
of others appears to have been well-known to charitable organizations. For instance,
the March of Dimes organization collected dimes for polio research using coin cards and
transparent coin canisters initially in door-to-door “marches” and later in public settings,
especially near cash registers at retail establishments throughout the U.S.
2between the two hypotheses we examine whether a discrete beneﬁtj u m p
upon completion of the project is necessary to achieve greater giving in the
dynamic game, and we explore the role played by feedback.
Our main ﬁnding is that contributions are signiﬁcantly larger in the
dynamic multiple-round version of the game as compared with the static
one-shot version of the game. However in our environment we do not ﬁnd
that Schelling’s or Marx and Matthews’ explanations can account for these
diﬀerences. While in the dynamic game subjects appear to condition their
giving on the giving of other members of their group, other ﬁndings are less
supportive of the theories. First, in contrast to Marx and Matthews, the
existence of a positive completion beneﬁt is not a critical determinant of con-
tributions being greater in the dynamic game. Second, when we eliminate
feedback on group contributions in the dynamic game, so that the informa-
tion becomes analogous to a static game, contributions exceed those of the
static game but are similar to those in the dynamic game with feedback. It
is diﬃcult to reconcile this ﬁnding with Schelling’s hypothesis. We conclude
with a discussion of an alternative explanation that may help account for
the diﬀerence in giving between the dynamic and static game environments.
2T h e o r e t i c a l A n a l y s i s
Here we describe a simpliﬁed version of the Marx and Matthews (2000)
model which we will use in our experimental design. There are n identical
individuals, i ∈ {1,...,n}, who participate in a fund-drive lasting T periods.
In any period t ∈ {1,....,T}, they must decide how much to contribute
to the public good. Let gi(t) denote individual i’s contribution and deﬁne
G(t)=
Pn
i=1 gi(t). Contributions are binding and non-refundable. At the
end of the fund-drive, individual i consumes what remains of her initial
endowment, w, and receives a beneﬁt from the public good that depends
on the aggregate contribution made by the n p l a y e r so v e ra l lp e r i o d so ft h e
fund-drive,
PT
t=1 G(t).S p e c i ﬁcally, player i’s payoﬀ at the end of period T
is given by:







The payoﬀ from the public good, f(
PT
t=1 G(t)), increases linearly with con-
tributions until funds are suﬃcient to complete the project. The project is
complete once the sum of contributions reach or exceed an exogenous and
known threshold, G.T h e m a r g i n a l b e n e ﬁt of contributing prior to reach-
3ing the threshold is λ. Upon completion, there is a discrete increase in the
beneﬁt; this increase is referred to as the completion beneﬁt and denoted by
b ≥ 0. The full beneﬁt of a completed project is B. Contributions in excess
of G do not increase the payoﬀ from the public good. That is, independent
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Individuals are informed of their own past contributions and of the past
sums of the group contributions. Player i’s personal history at the start of
period t is thus: ht−1
i =( gi(τ),G(τ))t−1
τ=1, and a player’s strategy maps the
state variable, ht−1
i into a feasible contribution gi(t) ≤ w−
Pt−1
τ=1 gi(τ).T h u s
with multiple contribution rounds players can condition future contributions
on past contribution histories.
For this game to constitute a social dilemma, we assume that it is eﬃ-
cient to complete the project, but that no single payoﬀ-maximizing individ-
ual will complete it by herself, i.e., B<G<n B . This assumption causes
zero-provision to always be an equilibrium outcome of the game. Note that
the social dilemma assumption implies that 0 < λ < 1. Thus it follows that,
absent a completion beneﬁt, i.e., b =0 ,i ti sa l w a y sc o s t l yt oc o n t r i b u t e
to the public good, and zero-provision is the unique equilibrium outcome.
This need not be the case when there is a completion beneﬁt. Provided
others contribute, a positive value of b may give the individual an incen-
tive to complete the project. To see why, consider ﬁrst the case where the
project can be completed with just one round of contributions. Obviously
an individual only contributes if the contributions by others, G−i,a r es h o r t
of the threshold, G. Furthermore, with λ < 1, contributions only occur
in the static game if an individual’s contribution is suﬃcient to complete
the project. The individual’s best response function can thus be derived
by comparing the payoﬀ from completing the project or giving nothing at
all. The individual completes the project and contributes gi = G − G−i iﬀ
w − gi + b + λG ≥ w + λG−i. Thus the project is completed if the needed
contribution, G − G−i ≤ g∗ ≡ b




G − G−i if G − G−i ≤ g∗,
0 otherwise.
4Given values of b and λ, in the static game there exist suﬃciently low thresh-
olds, G, such that completion and zero-provision equilibria coexist, and suf-
ﬁc i e n t l yh i g ht h r e s h o l d s ,G>n b
1−λ, such that zero-provision is the unique
equilibrium outcome.
An intriguing aspect of Marx and Matthews’ model is that an increase in
the number of contribution rounds may expand the set of equilibria. Even
when there are no completion equilibria in the static game, there will be a
suﬃciently large number of rounds at which there also will exist equilibria
that complete the eﬃciency-enhancing project. While a variety of strategies
may sustain completion, Marx and Matthews consider the so-called grim-g
strategy, with a sequence of nonnegative contributions as the equilibrium




t=1.A c c o r d i n gt ot h egrim-g strategy,
g0 is played in every period so long as the aggregate contribution level is
consistent with g0. If there is a deviation, as reﬂected in the aggregate con-
tribution level, all contributions cease in the following period. Thus, Marx
and Matthews’ grim-g strategy builds on Schelling’s insight that history-
contingent giving may play an important role in increasing contributions.
However, Marx and Matthews go even further. They show that while the
grim-g strategy cannot by itself increase contributions in ﬁnitely repeated
games, the addition of a positive completion beneﬁt may allow completion
of the public good to be sustained as an equilibrium outcome of the game.
The reason is that the grim-g strategy eventually leads to a contribution
level where an additional small contribution gives rise to a discrete jump in
payoﬀs. Thus with a completion beneﬁt the individual will eventually have
an incentive to complete the project, and this incentive is not driven by the
threat of future punishments. Eﬀectively, the grim-g strategy decreases both
the cost of contributing and the beneﬁt of free-riding in any given round.3
3Compte and Jehiel (2004) consider a dynamic voluntary contribution game similar to
the game of Marx and Matthews. At each stage of the game one player decides whether to
terminate the game by making no further contribution, or to make another contribution.
There is some maximum accumulated contribution, K.I nt h e i rg a m et h ep a y o ﬀ to player
i if the game is terminated with a total accumulated contribution k<Kis biK.I f t h e
maximum contribution is achieved at the time the game is terminated the payoﬀ to i is
aiK,w h e r ebi ≤ ai < 1.W h e n a exceeds b there is a discrete jump in the payoﬀ.T h e
contribution by one player increases the termination payoﬀ of the other player. If the
termination payoﬀ o fp l a y e r2i ss u ﬃciently high, then player 1 cannot expect to induce
by his current contribution a future contribution of player 2. But without that future
contribution, player 1’s current contribution is not proﬁtable. Therefore, there is an
upper bound on the amount of new contribution a player will make at any stage at which
that player decides to make a contribution rather than to terminate the game. Compte
and Jehiel show that if a>bthen this upper bound is positive and the accumulated total
increases gradually. However, if a = b for every i then no player will agree to make the
5To better comprehend the eﬀect of additional contribution rounds, con-
sider the following parametric example of a voluntary contribution game,
which we also adopt in our experimental design. Individuals are matched in
groups of three. Each member of a group is given an initial endowment of 6
‘chips’, and she is free to anonymously allocate any number of these chips to
the ‘group account’ or to her own, ‘private account’. After all members of
the group have made their decisions, the total number of chips in the group
account is announced to all members of the group and individual payoﬀsa r e
privately revealed to each group member. An individual gets 10 cents for
each chip that remains in her private account. The payoﬀ from the group
account depends on the total number of chips contributed to the group ac-
count by any of the three individuals. For each chip in the group account,
up to 11 chips, the individual and each member of her group receives 5 cents
(the value of 1/2 chip) so λ =0 .5. If the group account contains G =1 2or
more chips, each member receives a ﬁxed payment of 70 cents from the group
account. Thus, the completion beneﬁt is 10 cents for each group member,
which is equivalent to the value of one chip, so b =1 .
Consider ﬁrst the static case, i.e., where there is one contribution round
T =1 . The maximum contribution any member is willing to make in one
round is 2 chips ( b
1−λ = 1
.5 =2 ). With three individuals contributing,
and given G =1 2 , it follows that no-contribution is the unique equilibrium
outcome of the static game.
Note, however, that an increase in the number of contribution rounds
may enable us to sustain completion equilibria as well. Consider, for exam-
ple, the case where T =4 , i.e., there are four rounds in which any individual
can contribute. After every round of contributions all members of the group
are informed of the aggregate contribution to date. One example of a com-
pletion equilibrium is where each individual contributes one chip per round
provided that the most recent aggregate contribution is consistent with the
continuation of this strategy. If there is a deviation, then the individual
chooses not to contribute in subsequent rounds.
To see that such strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium, consider the
beneﬁt from deviating conditional on others playing the proposed equilib-
rium strategy. The payoﬀ to a player who follows the equilibrium strategy
is 90 (70 cents for completion beneﬁt + 20 cents for the 2 chips remaining in
the private account). As Table 1 shows, the payoﬀ to a player from deviating
is always less than 90, regardless of the round in which the deviation occurs.
last contribution so that in equilibrium no contribution is made. Hence in their model a
completion beneﬁt is also needed to secure provision in the dynamic game.
6Table 1: Deviation Payoﬀ Calculations
Deviation Beneﬁtf r o md e v i a t i n g
occurs in: Group + Private (cents)
Round 1 5 · 2+1 0· 6=7 0
Round 2 5 · 5+1 0· 5=7 5
Round 3 5 · 8+1 0· 4=8 0
Round 4 5 · 11 + 10 · 3=8 5
Summarizing, in our dynamic game example with positive completion
beneﬁt( b =1 )a n dT =4rounds, there are both completion and no-
contribution equilibria, while there is only a no-contribution equilibrium
in the static, T =1round game.4 Of course, there are many diﬀerent
completion equilibria of the dynamic game with positive completion beneﬁt,
all of which Pareto dominate the no-contribution equilibrium.5
If dynamic rather than static play leads individuals to complete the
project, then this is of substantial importance to practitioners seeking to
maximize contributions to their charity. Unfortunately, theory cannot help
us determine which of the two types of equilibria is more likely to occur.
It is therefore an empirical question whether contributions are larger in
the dynamic than in the static game. Similarly it is an empirical question
whether a potential increase in contributions in the dynamic game requires
the presence of a completion beneﬁta si nM a r xa n dM a t t h e w so ri f ,f o l -
lowing Schelling, an increase in contributions in the dynamic game is due
to the repeated opportunities to give and reduced price of trust aﬀorded by
the dynamic environment. We now turn to addressing these two empirical
questions.
4Note that for the theory to predict diﬀerent sets of equilibria in the dynamic and static
game, the completion beneﬁt can neither be too large nor too small. Conditional on the
time horizon, the number of contributors, and the marginal return from the public good,
any completion beneﬁt between 5 and 20 cents (b ∈ [.5,2]) admits completion equilibria
in the dynamic game, but not in the static one. If the beneﬁte x c e e d s2 0c e n t s( b>2)
there also exist completion equilibria in the static game, and if the beneﬁti sl e s st h a n5
cents (b<. 5) completion equilibria cease to exist in the dynamic game (given that the
smallest unit of contribution is 1). Thus the 10 cent completion beneﬁt( b =1 )i snot a
knife-edge case.
5Other examples of symmetric contributions (gi(1),g i(2),g i(3),g i(4)) that can be sus-
t a i n e db yag r i m - gs t r a t e g ya r e : (2,1,1,0), (1,2,1,0), (1,1,2,0), (2,2,0,0), (3,1,0,0).
Similar proﬁles where the contributions are postponed to later rounds can also be sus-
tained. Note that the preference for contributing rather than deviating only is strict in
every round for the two ﬁrst contribution proﬁles.
73 Experimental Design
In the experiment, we use the same parameterization of the game as in
the example of Section 2, i.e., n =3 , λ = .5, G =1 2chips, and the
value of each chip allocated to an individual’s private account is 10 cents.
The remaining parameter values are the focus of our 2 × 2 experimental
design. The ﬁrst treatment variable is the number of contribution rounds,
T. We consider both the static case, where T =1 , and the dynamic case
where T =4 . The second treatment variable is the value of the completion
beneﬁt. We consider the case where there is a positive completion beneﬁt,
b =1 , as well as the case where there is no completion beneﬁt, b =0 .W h i l e
increased giving in the dynamic case, T =4 ,w h e nb =1is consistent with
both Schelling and Marx and Matthews, we use the dynamic case when
b =0to distinguish between the two theories. Recall from the discussion
above that when b =0 , no-contribution is the unique payoﬀ-maximizing
equilibrium outcome of both the dynamic and static games. Thus we can
use the dynamic game treatments (b =0vs. b =1 ) to determine whether a
potential increase in contributions in the dynamic game (relative to the static
game) is due to the completion beneﬁt and the expanded set of equilibria
it allows, (Marx and Matthews) or simply due to the increased number of
contribution rounds, with the completion beneﬁt being irrelevant (Schelling’s
hypothesis). We refer to the four main treatments of our experiment as: 1.
static with completion beneﬁt; 2. dynamic with completion beneﬁt; 3. static
without completion beneﬁt;a n d4. dynamic without completion beneﬁt.6
All sessions of the experiment were computerized and were conducted
in the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory. Participants were
recruited from the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon Univer-
sity. Each session involved exactly 15 inexperienced subjects. A session
proceeded as follows. Subjects were seated at computers and were given a
set of written instructions, a payoﬀ table, a record sheet, and a short quiz.
The experimenter read the instructions aloud to all participants. The payoﬀ
structure was written on the board, and the payoﬀ table was projected on
an overhead screen for all to see. Once the instructions were ﬁnished par-
ticipants were asked to complete a written quiz. The quiz was collected, an
6As described later, we also conduct a ﬁfth treatment, aimed at further testing
Schelling’s hypothesis. In this ﬁfth treatment, subjects played a dynamic game with
no completion beneﬁt and no feedback on group contributions between rounds. Absent
feedback the information of the multiple-round game is equivalent to that of the static
game. To capture the multiple-round feature of the game we nonetheless refer to it as a
‘dynamic’ game.
8answer key was given to each participant, and the answers were reviewed
using an overhead projector. Subjects then began the experiment. They
were asked to record all decisions in the experiment on a record sheet. They
played a total of 15 games. All games in a session were played under the
same treatment condition. Each game consisted of 1 or 4 rounds, depend-
ing on the treatment. Prior to each new game, subjects were randomly
and anonymously matched with two other participants, with the stipulation
that no one was matched with the same participant twice in a row. Sub-
jects’ identities were never revealed to one another. Following completion of
the 15th game, subjects were paid their earnings from all games played and
also received a $5 show-up payment; payments were made anonymously by
subject number.
We conducted four sessions of each of the four main treatments, for
a total of 240 participants. The experiment typically lasted between 60-
90 minutes and participants’ earnings averaged $15.25 (standard deviation
of $0.81, maximum of $17.95, and minimum of $12.90). A copy of the
instructions for the dynamic game with completion beneﬁti sp r o v i d e di n
the Appendix; other instructions are similar. The only change for the static
treatment with completion beneﬁti st h a tp a r t i c i p a n t sw e r eg i v e no n l yo n e
round to contribute, and in the treatments without completion beneﬁtt h e
only change is that the payoﬀ at completion was 60 cents rather than 70
cents (b =0rather than b =1 ).
4H y p o t h e s e s
Marx and Matthew’s point predictions for the environment that we examine
are very stark. While some equilibria complete the project in the dynamic
game with a completion beneﬁt, there is a unique zero-provision equilibrium
in the two static treatments as well as in the dynamic treatment without a
completion beneﬁt.
All previous voluntary contribution experiments have used payoﬀ struc-
tures that diﬀer from the one used in this study; our choice of a diﬀerent
payoﬀ structure is necessitated by the theoretical hypotheses we seek to test.
A consequence, however, is that our ﬁndings will not be directly comparable
to the ﬁndings of prior studies. Nonetheless, prior voluntary contribution ex-
periments have elements in common with our design and those prior studies
suggest that we should be unlikely to ﬁnd strong support for the equilibrium
point predictions of the theory we are testing. For example, absent comple-
tion our static treatments are very similar to the frequently studied linear
9voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). The only diﬀerence is that, while
in our setting the return from giving changes once the threshold is reached,
in a linear VCM the marginal return from contributing to the public good
is some constant λ, which is independent of the contribution level.7 With
λ < 1 the unique equilibrium prediction of the linear VCM is zero contri-
butions to the public good. In sharp contrast, experimental investigations
of the linear VCM consistently ﬁnd that contributions are substantial and
signiﬁcantly greater than zero.8
If the contribution patterns of previous studies extend to the environ-
ment examined here, then we may observe positive contributions in all four
of our treatments. To investigate the eﬀect of dynamic play we focus instead
on the comparative static predictions. The primary question of interest is
whether contributions are larger and completion is more likely in dynamic as
opposed to static contribution games. To investigate the ‘completion beneﬁt’
hypothesis by Marx and Matthews as well as Schelling’s ‘small-price-of-trust’
hypothesis, we focus on the role played by the completion beneﬁt. While
the ‘completion-beneﬁt’ hypothesis predicts that contributions will only be
larger in the dynamic game when there is a positive completion beneﬁt,
Schelling’s ‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis suggests instead that dynamic
play may increase contributions independent of whether there is any com-
pletion beneﬁt.
Previous experimental studies have examined either the diﬀerence be-
tween sequential and simultaneous move contributions, or the eﬀect of var-
ious revision rules in dynamic move games.9 Thus they do not help us
7If we had set λ =0for group contributions below the completion threshold, our payoﬀ
structure would be identical to a provision-point mechanism (see e.g., Isaac, Schmidtz, and
Walker (1989), Bagnoli and McKee (1991), and Croson and Marks (1998) for examples of
studies using that type of mechanism). Such a change in the payoﬀ structure changes the
characteristics of the equilibria substantially. In a social dilemma with a provision point
mechanism there are multiple equilibria in both the static and dynamic games.
8These contributions may either reﬂect “mistakes” or “other regarding preferences” or
both. Ledyard (1995, pp. 170-2) estimates that mistakes account for 20-25% of these
contributions. The notion that an individual’s preferences are not restricted to a player’s
own monetary payoﬀ is a topic that has been heavily explored in recent years. See,
Camerer (2003) for a review of this literature.
9The evidence on sequential versus simultaneous games is mixed, e.g., Andreoni, Brown
and Vesterlund (2002), Gaechter and Renner, (2003), and Potters, Sefton, and Vesterlund
(forthcoming) ﬁnd that sequential moves do not increase contributions, whereas Erev and
Rapoport (1990) and Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003) ﬁnd greater cooperation with
sequential moves. Studies on dynamic games typically do not include a comparable static
treatment, thus they do not allow us to determine whether contributions are likely to be
larger with dynamic rather than static contributions (see e.g., Dorsey (1992), Kurzban,
10determine whether we generally should anticipate greater contributions in
the dynamic or in the static game. However, as in this study, two recent
studies do examine the eﬀect of dynamic play. While very diﬀerent from our
setting, their ﬁndings nonetheless suggest that contributions may be larger
in a dynamic game. Andreoni and Samuelson (2006) show that cooperation
and earnings increase when the stakes of a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game
are split between two plays of the prisoner’s dilemma game.10 Choi, Gale
and Kariv (2006) study a threshold public good game and also ﬁnd greater
contributions in the dynamic than in the static version of that game.11
Although the potential ﬁnding that dynamic play inﬂuences behavior
independent of the completion beneﬁt is not consistent with the predictions
of Marx and Matthews, it need not imply that the expanded set of equi-
libria does not inﬂuence behavior. To examine if the completion beneﬁt
nonetheless aﬀects behavior we also subject the data to a series of alterna-
tive tests. First, comparing the two dynamic treatments we determine if as
predicted contributions are greater with a completion beneﬁt than without.
Second, we determine if the diﬀerence between static and dynamic play is
greater with a completion beneﬁt than without one. Third, examining the
last round of the dynamic game when the sum of past contributions are
close to the threshold we determine if contributions are more likely in the
presence of a completion beneﬁt
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Positive completion beneﬁt, b =1 : Dynamic versus Sta-
tic Games
Every session of a treatment consisted of ﬁfteen repetitions of the same
game. With ﬁve 3-player groups interacting in each game of a session, we
McCabe, Smith and Wilson (2001), Goren, Rapoport, and Kurzban (2004), Guth, Levati,
and Stiehler (2002)). While Dorsey’s study does not include a static treatment, the
parameters are similar to those of previous static studies, and the results suggest that
contributions are larger with dynamic contributions.
10The payoﬀs, number of players, number of contribution rounds, as well as the predicted
equilibria diﬀer substantially from our model. Interestingly, in our model the stakes in
each period are endogenously determined by the players.
11They have many possible equilibria in both their static and dynamic treatments.
By contrast, in three of our treatments, there is a unique zero contribution equilibrium.
Multiple completion equilibria exist only in our fourth treatment, the dynamic game with
a completion beneﬁt. Thus if an expansion in the set of equilibria inﬂuences behavior,
contributions should be unambiguously greater in our dynamic game with a completion
beneﬁt.
11observed a total of 75 group contributions in each experimental session. We
treat data from each individual session as an independent observation.
Table 2 reports the number (percent) of groups (out of 75) in each session
who had ﬁnal contributions that either reached the threshold of 12 or came
close, where ‘close’ is deﬁned as an end-of-game group total of 10 or more
chips.12
Table 2: Number (percent) of the 75 Observations where
the Group Contribution Exceeds a Speciﬁed Level, b =1
Groups with
12 or more chips 10 or more chips
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Session 1 0 (0.0) 8 (10.7) 1 (1.3) 19 (25.3)
Session 2 0 (0.0) 11 (14.7) 1 (1.3) 28 (37.3)
Session 3 0 (0.0) 13 (17.3) 0 (0.0) 29 (38.7)
Session 4 0 (0.0) 6 (8.0) 0 (0.0) 11 (14.7)
Average 0 (0.0) 10 (10.6) 0.5 (0.7) 22 (29.3)
Consistent with Marx and Matthews’ hypothesis, not a single group
contribution of the static game with completion beneﬁte v e rr e a c h e dt h e
threshold of 12 chips. Indeed, only a couple of groups in the static treatment
even came close to achieving the completion equilibrium. On the other
hand, in the dynamic game treatment with a completion beneﬁt, more than
10 percent of the groups reached the threshold of 12 chips, and almost a
third contributed 10 or more chips. Treating each session as an observation
we can easily reject the hypothesis that groups are no less likely to reach
the threshold in the static game than in the dynamic game in favor of the
alternative that the threshold is more likely to be reached in the dynamic
game than in the static game (one-sided p =0 .014).13
Pooling the data from the four sessions of each of the two treatments,
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of group contributions. Once again we
see that there is a change in behavior when the number of contribution
rounds is increased. While more than 35% of the groups in the static game
never succeed in contributing, this number is less than 15% in the dynamic
game. Group contributions are larger in the dynamic treatments, and the
associated cumulative distribution function (CDF) ﬁrst order stochastically
12Contributions close to the threshold are included because it may be argued that the
members of the relevant group understood the eﬃcient equilibria, but failed to coordinate
on who should contribute towards the end of the game.
13Unless otherwise noted all reported test statistics are Mann-Whitney U-tests.
12dominates that for the static treatment. These results are consistent with














Figure 1: Distribution of Group Contributions, b>0.
It is, however, clear that in both the static and dynamic games, a sub-
stantial portion of the observed group contribution levels are inconsistent
with the predicted equilibrium outcomes for payoﬀ-maximizing contributors
(group contributions of 0 or 12). Perhaps the intermediate group contribu-
tion levels in the dynamic game are evidence of the coordination problem
that arises from the multiple equilibria that are present in the dynamic
contribution game.14
The data above suggest that, in the dynamic game, the average group
contributions are larger than those of the static game. We now determine the
magnitude of this diﬀerence and whether it is signiﬁcant. Table 3 reports
average group contributions for each session and treatment. Whether we
look at all 15 games, the ﬁrst 5, or the last 5, the result is always the same:
average contributions are larger in every session of the dynamic game as
compared with the static game. Thus we easily reject the hypothesis that
in the static treatment average contributions are greater than or equal to
those in the dynamic treatment (one-sided p =0 .014).15 The diﬀerence is
both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. During the last ﬁve games,
14Recall that there are multiple completion equilibria in this game and that no-
completion always remains an equilibrium possibility.
15The results are similar if we instead use random eﬀects to determine the eﬀect of
13the average contribution in the dynamic game is nearly three times larger
than that of the static game. While one might have expected that, over time,
participants would learn to take advantage of the socially eﬃcient equilibria,
we see instead that contributions decrease with experience.16 Note however
that the diﬀerence between the static and dynamic game is maintained over
t h ec o u r s eo ft h ee x p e r i m e n t .
Table 3: Average Group Contribution by Session, b>0
Average group contribution
All 15 games First 5 games Last 5 games
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Session 1 2.75 6.29 4.04 8.48 1.92 4.36
Session 2 3.03 7.43 3.56 10.24 2.28 5.04
Session 3 2.80 7.25 4.6 8.84 0.96 6.16
Session 4 3.49 5.05 5.56 6.16 2.16 4.32
Average 3.02 6.51 4.44 8.43 1.83 4.97
Recall from our example in Section 2 that one strategy that can support
a completion equilibrium in the dynamic game has each player contribute
one chip per round. This symmetric sequence of contributions is not the
only one that can support a completion equilibrium, but in the absence
of any communication among group players, it would seem to be a natural,
focal candidate to examine. And, indeed, there is evidence that some groups
succeed in having a per round group contribution of 3 units.17
A common condition by which various, alternative grim-g strategies
secure completion is that individual i’s contributions depend on past in-
creases in the group total by other members of the group (excluding mem-
ber i).18 The same holds for Schelling’s ‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis
where continued contributions by others will cease if others stop giving. To
examine the potential eﬀect of dynamic play, we therefore examine the fre-
quencies with which players contribute any positive number of chips to the
dynamic play on contributions. Regressing individual contributions by game on a dummy
for whether the game was dynamic, we consistently ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the dynamic
dummy variable is statistically signiﬁcant (p =0 .00 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 and last 5 games).
16Voluntary contributions typically decrease over the course of a repeated static public
good game experiment, however even with many repetitions they do not disappear.
17The second most frequent per-round contribution is 1. The fraction of people con-
tributing 1 is 32% in round 1, 29% in round 2, 24% in round 3, and 14% in round 4.
18Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that contributions when G−i =0are
part of a dynamic equilibrium strategy. However, it seems unlikely that subjects would
be able to coordinate on such turn—taking strategies.
14group account in round t, conditional on either 1) their group’s contribu-
tion, excluding their own individual contribution, increased in the previous
round t − 1, G−i(t − 1) > 0,o r2) their group’s contribution, excluding
their own, individual contribution, did not change in the previous round,
G−i(t−1) = 0. Both hypotheses suggest that individuals are more likely to
give when G−i(t − 1) > 0 than when G−i(t − 1) = 0. Using data from all
games of a session, Table 4 reports the conditional frequencies by session for
rounds 2, 3, and 4 of the dynamic game with completion beneﬁt. We see that
subjects are two or three times more likely to contribute if G−i > 0 than
if G−i =0 . This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant in round—by—round or
in all—round, pairwise comparisons using the session—level data in Table 4
(one-sided p ≤ .057 in all cases).
Table 4: Frequency with which Players make Non-Zero Contributions in Period t
Conditional on G−i(t − 1).D y n a m i cb>0 Session Level Data
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
G−i=0 Session 1 0.100 0.148 0.097 0.118
Session 2 0.235 0.220 0.198 0.211
Session 3 0.176 0.236 0.150 0.184
Session 4 0.175 0.111 0.028 0.087
All Sessions 0.170 0.167 0.110 0.141
G−i> 0 Session 1 0.378 0.385 0.198 0.335
Session 2 0.545 0.373 0.261 0.414
Session 3 0.476 0.418 0.344 0.422
Session 4 0.358 0.316 0.238 0.317
All Sessions 0.443 0.376 0.266 0.377
In summary, consistent with the two hypotheses, we ﬁnd that in the
presence of a completion beneﬁt, individuals condition their contributions
on past contributions of others and that overall contributions are larger in
the dynamic game than in the static game.
5.2 No completion beneﬁt, b =0 : Dynamic versus Static
Games
To distinguish between our two hypotheses we examine behavior in the dy-
namic and static games without a completion beneﬁt. We focus on the
15‘completion-beneﬁt’ hypothesis that in this case there should be no diﬀer-
ence in contribution behavior between the dynamic and the static game.
The reason, again, is that independent of past and future play it is a dom-
inant strategy not to contribute. Thus the unique equilibrium outcome of
the static or dynamic game without a completion beneﬁt is no-contribution,
and we can use the behavior in these two treatments to determine which of
our two theories best explain the diﬀerences in behavior between the static
and dynamic game with a completion beneﬁt.
Table 5 (the analogue of Table 2) reports the number (percent) of groups
(out of 75) in each session who had ﬁnal contributions that either reached
the threshold of 12 or came close, i.e., an end-of-game group total of 10 or
more chips. In contrast to the theory by Marx and Matthews, we ﬁnd that
absent a completion beneﬁt, behavior in the dynamic game is still diﬀerent
from behavior in the static game. In particular, groups in the dynamic game
are more likely to reach the threshold than groups in the static game. We
can, again, easily reject the hypothesis that groups are at least as likely to
reach the threshold in the static game as in the dynamic game (one-sided
p =0 .014). Only one group in the static game managed to achieve the
threshold of 12 chips (this occurred in the very ﬁrst game of Session 1).
Across the four sessions of the dynamic game, an average of 6 percent of
groups achieved the completion equilibrium and another 10 percent came
close.
Table 5: Number (percent) of 75 Observations where the
Group Contribution Exceeds a Speciﬁed Level, b =0
Groups with
12 or more chips 10 or more chips
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Session 1 1 (1.3) 2 (2.7) 2 (2.7) 9 (12.0)
Session 2 0 (0.0) 5 (6.7) 1 (1.3) 12 (16.0)
Session 3 0 (0.0) 8 (10.7) 0 (0.0) 15 (20.0)
Session 4 0 (0.0) 3 (4.0) 1 (1.3) 11 (14.7)
Average 0.25 (0.3) 4.5 (6.0) 1 (1.3) 11.75 (15.7)
Pooling the data from the four sessions we also note that the distribu-
tions of group contributions diﬀer between the static and dynamic games.
As shown in Figure 4, almost half of the static groups never contribute,
while the number is less than 20 percent for the dynamic groups. Group
contributions tend to be larger in the dynamic treatment without a comple-
tion beneﬁt, and the CDF of group contributions in the dynamic game ﬁrst















Figure 4: Distribution of Group Contributions, b =0
Table 6 (the analogue of Table 3) reports average group contributions
for each session and treatment. Whether we look at all 15 games, the ﬁrst
5 or the last 5, average contributions are smaller in the static game than
in the dynamic game. Thus, consistent with Schelling’s hypothesis, we may
reject the hypothesis that average contributions in the static game are greater
than or equal to those in the dynamic game (one-sided p ≤ 0.057).19 Similar
to the completion beneﬁt sessions, we observe a decrease in contributions
with experience, and the eﬀect of multiple contribution rounds is maintained
throughout.
19The results are similar if we instead use random eﬀects to determine the eﬀect of
dynamic play on contributions. Regressing individual contributions by game on a dummy
for whether the game was dynamic, we consistently ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the dynamic
dummy variable is signiﬁcant (p =0 .00 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 and last 5 games).
17Table 6: Average Group Contribution by Session, b =0
Average group contribution
All 15 games First 5 games Last 5 games
Static Dynamic Static Dynamic Static Dynamic
Session 1 3.64 4.47 4.68 6.00 2.80 2.64
Session 2 2.04 5.37 4.72 7.72 0.36 3.92
Session 3 2.51 6.05 3.88 7.92 1.08 4.52
Session 4 2.39 4.75 3.64 7.32 0.92 1.92
Average 2.65 5.16 4.23 7.24 1.29 3.25
To examine the eﬀect of dynamic play we compare the frequencies by
which players contribute a positive number of chips to the group account in
round t, conditional on other group members increasing their contribution
in the previous round, G−i(t − 1) > 0, and not changing their contribution
in the previous round, G−i(t−1) = 0. Under Schelling’s hypothesis, players
should condition on this information. Using data from all games of a ses-
sion, Table 7 (the analogue of Table 4) reports the conditional frequencies
by session for rounds 2, 3, and 4 for the dynamic game without a comple-
tion beneﬁt. Consistent with Schelling’s hypothesis, subjects are much more
likely to contribute if G−i > 0 than if G−i =0 . This diﬀerence is statis-
tically signiﬁcant in round—by—round or in all—round, pairwise comparisons
within treatments using the session—level data in Table 7 (one-sided p ≤ .057
in all cases). Thus even when there is no completion beneﬁt participants are
more likely to contribute when others contributed in the previous round.
Table 7: Frequency with which Players make Non-Zero Contributions in Period t
Conditional on G−i(t − 1).D y n a m i cb =0Session Level Data
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
G−i=0 Session 1 0.081 0.074 0.034 0.057
Session 2 0.115 0.188 0.117 0.140
Session 3 0.279 0.136 0.114 0.148
Session 4 0.098 0.049 0.030 0.047
All Sessions 0.135 0.106 0.071 0.094
G−i> 0 Session 1 0.448 0.368 0.188 0.364
Session 2 0.428 0.287 0.295 0.351
Session 3 0.418 0.336 0.290 0.362
Session 4 0.362 0.282 0.115 0.293
All Sessions 0.413 0.319 0.233 0.344
185.3 Comparison between treatments with (b =1 )a n dw i t h -
out (b =0 )c o m p l e t i o nb e n e ﬁts
We next compare contribution behavior between static (dynamic) treat-
ments when there is or is not a completion beneﬁt. The relevant data are
reported in Tables 2 through 7. Although the completion beneﬁti m p l i e s
a larger potential payoﬀ, in the static game it has no theoretical eﬀect on
the equilibrium level of contributions. Comparing behavior in the static
games with and without a completion beneﬁt(b = 1o rb = 0 ) we cannot reject
the hypothesis that these groups are equally likely to reach the threshold
(two-sided p =0 .343), nor that they are equally likely to come close to the
threshold (two-sided p =0 .486). Similarly we cannot reject the hypothe-
sis that there is no diﬀerence in the average group contributions (two-sided
p ≥ 0.343 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 or last 5 games).20
In the dynamic game, the completion beneﬁt expands the set of equilibria
to include full completion. If this expanded set of equilibria aﬀects behavior
then average contributions are predicted to be larger when there is a comple-
tion beneﬁt. When comparing behavior in the dynamic treatments with and
without a completion beneﬁt we ﬁnd some evidence of a completion-beneﬁt
eﬀect. While we can reject the hypothesis that groups without a completion
beneﬁt are at least as likely to reach the threshold as those with a com-
pletion beneﬁt( o n e - s i d e dp =0 .043), we cannot reject the hypothesis that
they are at least as likely to come close to the threshold (i.e., contribute
10 or more chips, one-sided p =0 .293 ).21 Although the magnitudes are
not large, we ﬁnd that over the 15 games the completion beneﬁti n c r e a s e s
average contributions in the dynamic game (one-sided p =0 .057).22
Since the return from contributing is greater in the presence of a com-
pletion beneﬁt, it is not straightforward to compare contribution levels with
and without a completion beneﬁt.23 As an alternative assessment of the
‘completion beneﬁt’ hypothesis one may ask whether the eﬀect of dynamic
20T h er e s u l t sa r es i m i l a ri fw ei n s t e a du s er a n d o me ﬀects. Regressing individual contri-
butions by game on a dummy for the completion beneﬁtw eﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on
completion beneﬁti si n s i g n i ﬁcant (p ≥ 0.217 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 and last 5 games).
21D u et ot i e st h e s ep - v a l u e sa r ea p p r o x i m a t e .
22The diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst 5 and the last 5 games (one-sided p =0 .1
and p =0 .057, respectively). Using random eﬀects we get the same result. Regressing
individual contributions per game on a dummy for the presence of a positive completion
beneﬁt, the coeﬃcient on the completion beneﬁt dummy is signiﬁcant (for all 15 games
p =0 .033, the ﬁrst 5 games p =0 .105, and for the last 5 games p =0 .015).
23Isaac and Walker (1988) show that contributions in a linear VCM increase with the
return to giving.
19play is greater with a completion beneﬁt. Speciﬁcally, is the increase in
contributions when moving from a static to a dynamic game greater when
there is a completion beneﬁt? The results from our study suggest that this
increase in contributions is not sensitive to the completion beneﬁt.24
To further determine the eﬀect of the expanded set of equilibria in the
dynamic game with a completion beneﬁt we focus on behavior in the last
contribution round. Intuitively, in the dynamic game the completion beneﬁt
should have its greatest eﬀect in the last round of those games in which
aggregate contributions have reached at least 6 by the end of round 3, and
each individual has at least 2 chips in their private accounts. The reason
is that each individual is willing to contribute as many as two chips to
complete the project. Thus it is possible to complete the project in the
last round provided that six chips have been contributed and each player
has 2 chips available. We look for the eﬀect of the completion beneﬁtb y
comparing round 4 contributions with and without the completion beneﬁt
conditional on the cumulative contributions in round 3 having reached either
6 or 9 chips. Although we ﬁnd larger, round-4 contributions when there is
a completion beneﬁt (mean of 0.38 vs. 0.30 when 5 <
P3
t=1 G(t) < 12,a n d
mean of 0.41 vs. 0.38 when 8 <
P3
t=1 G(t) < 12) these diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcant in either of the two cases (one sided p-values 0.3429 and 0.7571).
In summary, contributions are signiﬁcantly higher in the dynamic game
than in the comparable static game, and players condition their behavior
on changes in the level of group contributions in the dynamic games. In
the presence of a completion beneﬁt, these ﬁndings are consistent with both
of our hypotheses. However the observation that dynamic play has a sim-
ilar eﬀect in the absence of a completion beneﬁt and that the increase in
contributions from static to dynamic moves does not appear to depend on
24Since we conducted a between-subject comparison of the dynamic and static treat-
ments, there is no natural pairing between the sessions we conducted under each treatment.
To achieve a quantitative measure of the eﬀect of dynamic play we therefore look at all the
possible diﬀerences between the four sessions under dynamic play and the four sessions
under static play when b =1a n dt h e nw h e nb =0 . Conditional on the completion ben-
eﬁt, there are 24 possible diﬀerences between the static and dynamic treatments. When
testing whether the eﬀect of dynamic play is greater with a completion beneﬁtw eﬁnd
the p-values of the 24
2 =5 7 6possible combinations. Whether one looks at all 15, the
ﬁrst 5, or the last 5 games, the result is always the same: the median and the mean of
the distribution of one-sided p-values equals 0.1714. The result is the same if we instead
use regressions with random eﬀects to determine whether the inﬂuence of dynamic play
is greater when there is a completion beneﬁt. Regressing contributions on dummies for
whether the game was dynamic, there was a completion beneﬁt, as well as the interaction
between two, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on the interaction is insigniﬁcant whether we
look at all 15, ﬁr s t5o rt h el a s t5g a m e s( p ≥ 0.156).
20there being a completion beneﬁt is more supportive of Schelling’s hypothe-
sis. We therefore choose to investigate, the ‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis
in greater detail.25
5.4 A further test of Schelling’s hypothesis
According to Schelling, having multiple contribution rounds enables donors
to build up trust as they only need to sacriﬁce small contributions to test
how cooperative other members of the group are. This ‘small-price-of-trust’
hypothesis relies critically on players’ receiving feedback on the aggregate
group contribution levels; without feedback, the possibility of sustaining
trust is greatly weakened, (though tacit coordination schemes cannot be
ruled out).
To test the eﬀect of feedback we developed a ﬁfth treatment, which is
identical to the dynamic treatment without a completion beneﬁt, except that
the individual donor receives no feedback on what the other members of her
group contribute over the course of each 4-round game. However, players
are informed of the cumulative group contribution at the end of the fourth
round of each dynamic game. Thus, the available information is equivalent
to that given in the static game with no completion beneﬁt.26
We compare contribution behavior in the dynamic b =0game with and
without feedback. If the ‘small-price of trust’ hypothesis is true, then the
absence of feedback ought to reduce contributions. As we did for each of
our other four treatments, we recruited 60 new participants and conducted
four sessions of this ﬁfth treatment — the dynamic contribution game with
no completion beneﬁt and no feedback between rounds.27 The frequencies
for various group contribution levels in the three b =0treatments — the
static, dynamic with no feedback (NFB), and dynamic with feedback (FB)
are shown in Figure 7. The general impression this ﬁgure conveys is that
group contributions in the dynamic game with no feedback are, on average,
25The important role played by the completion beneﬁt relies on a player’s ability to
apply backward induction. Experimental evidence that players can backward induct more
than 1 or 2 rounds is scant see e.g., Rosenthal and Palfrey (1992), Neelin, Sonnenschein,
and Spiegal (1988).
26Removing or limiting the feedback that players receive, while seemingly unnatural, is
increasingly being used by researchers to test learning theories, which make heavy reliance
on such feedback. See, e.g., Weber (2003). As Schelling’s hypothesis does not depend on
the existence of a positive completion beneﬁtw ec h o s et os e tb =0in this treatment.
27Given the information equivalence to the static game the multiple-round game is not
a dynamic game, however to capture the multiple opportunities to give we nonetheless
r e f e rt oi ta ss u c h .
21‘intermediate’ between those in the static game and those in the dynamic
game with feedback. Table 8 reports average contributions from these four
sessions. Comparing these to the results in Table 6 we see, ﬁrst, that al-
though the dynamic games without feedback are strategically equivalent
to the static (b =0 ) games, contributions in the former are signiﬁcantly
larger.28 Second, and more importantly, in contrast to the ‘small-price-of-
trust’ hypothesis we ﬁnd that average contributions in the dynamic game

















Figure 7: Frequency of Group Contributions, b =0
Perhaps a more appropriate test of Schelling’s hypothesis is to compare
contributions in the ﬁrst contribution round of the four-round game. As
suggested by our initial quote, Schelling argued that the beneﬁto fo b s e r v e d
dynamic play is that it removes most of the risk from the initial contribution.
In the presence of feedback there is a larger incentive to contribute and
28Using session level data one-sided p ≤ 0.057 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 and last 5 games. An
analysis based on random eﬀects yields the same result, as the coeﬃcient on static is
negative and signiﬁcant (p ≤ 0.019 for all 15, ﬁrst 5 and last 5 games).
29Over all 15 games average group contributions are slightly larger and marginally sig-
niﬁcant with a one-sided p =0 .10, however this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst
5 games (one-sided p =0 .207) nor for the last 5 games (one-sided p =0 .343). Thus, we
easily reject the two-sided hypothesis that feedback has no eﬀect. The result is the same
using random eﬀects. Regressing individual contributions over the 4 rounds on a dummy
for Feedback, we ﬁnd a marginally signiﬁcant coeﬃcient over all 15 games ( p =0 .087),
but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst 5 nor for the last 5 games (p =0 .11 and
p =0 .247, respectively).
22test the trust of others, thus an alternative test of the hypothesis is that
contributions in round 1 are larger with than without feedback. However,
as with the aggregate contributions, we do not ﬁnd that the average ﬁrst-
round individual contribution signiﬁcantly depends on the availability of
feedback.30
Table 8: Average Group Contribution by Session
in the Dynamic Game with no Feedback, b =0 .
Average group contribution
All 15 games First 5 games Last 5 games
Session 1 2.71 4.12 1.24
Session 2 4.19 6.00 2.92
Session 3 4.47 6.44 3.04
Session 4 5.24 7.84 2.88
Average 4.15 6.10 2.52
While the average group contribution data lend little support to the
‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis, the conditional contribution data paints
ad i ﬀerent picture. Speciﬁcally the hypothesis implies that players in a
dynamic game with feedback will condition their behavior in rounds 2, 3
and 4 on the information they receive prior to the play of each of these
rounds. If they do not then this would serve as further evidence against the
‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis. Recall that in the two feedback treatments
subjects are more likely to contribute when G−i(t − 1) > 0 than when
G−i(t − 1) = 0. For comparison Table 9 reports the conditional frequencies
by session for rounds 2, 3, and 4 when there is no feedback (b =0 ,N F B ) .N o t
surprisingly we cannot reject that the frequency of contributing conditional
on G−i =0is the same as when G−i > 0 (e.g., using data for all rounds,
one-sided p =0 .243; similar results obtain in round—by—round comparisons).
Feedback inﬂuences the conditional contribution data, and in support of
the ‘small-price-of—trust’ hypothesis Section 5.3 showed that dynamic play
does not have a more signiﬁcant role in the presence of a completion beneﬁt.
However, since the overall level of contributions in the dynamic games with
30Over all 15 games average round-1 group contributions are slightly larger and mar-
ginally signiﬁcant with a one-sided p =0 .10, however this diﬀerence is not signiﬁcant for
the ﬁrst 5 games (one-sided p =0 .207) nor for the last 5 games (one-sided p =0 .343).
Certainly we can reject the two-sided hypothesis that feedback has no eﬀect. The result
is similar using random eﬀects. Regressing individual round-1 contributions on a dummy
for Feedback, the coeﬃcient on Feedback is insigniﬁcant whether it is for all 15, ﬁrst 5 or
just the last 5 games (p ≥ 0.142).
23feedback and without are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, it is diﬃcult to argue
that the increase in contributions we observe when moving from a static to
a dynamic contribution game is caused by the small price of trust.
Table 9: Frequency with which Players make Non-Zero Contributions in Period t
Conditional on G−i(t − 1).D y n a m i cb =0No Feedback Session Level Data
Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 All Rounds
G−i=0 Session 1 0.182 0.140 0.202 0.175
Session 2 0.184 0.179 0.208 0.191
Session 3 0.134 0.115 0.136 0.128
Session 4 0.150 0.151 0.216 0.177
All Sessions 0.160 0.145 0.189 0.166
G−i> 0 Session 1 0.203 0.134 0.211 0.185
Session 2 0.236 0.271 0.259 0.253
Session 3 0.151 0.117 0.061 0.121
Session 4 0.276 0.267 0.221 0.260
All Sessions 0.221 0.204 0.201 0.211
5.5 Why are contributions higher in the dynamic game?
In designing this experiment we soug h tt ot e s tt w om e c h a n i s m sb yw h i c h
contributions in a dynamic public good game might exceed those in a static
game. We have not found strong evidence to suggest that either mechanism
is causing the increase in contributions. That by itself is an important
ﬁnding. However, it leads naturally to questions as to what alternative
factors or mechanisms might account for our ﬁndings.
While theories other than those by Schelling and Marx and Matthews
may suggest larger contributions in the dynamic than static games, these
generally rely on the fact that individuals in the dynamic game can condi-
tion their contributions on the past contributions of others.31 However any
theory that relies on conditional contributions will have diﬃculty explaining
why average contributions in our no-feedback treatment are similar to those
in the dynamic game with feedback (b =0 ). Understanding why contribu-
tions in the dynamic game without feedback exceed those of the static game
31e.g., Romano and Yildirim, 2001, show that contributions in a dynamic game may
be larger than in a static game if individual best response functions are increasing in the
contributions of other donors.
24may therefore be the key to understanding why in our environment dynamic
play generally increases contributions.
One reason for the larger than expected contributions in the no-feedback
treatment may be that, while the game theoretically is identical to the static
one, it oﬀers four times as many opportunities to give. With every opportu-
nity to give there is also an opportunity for trembles or mistakes, and indeed
in our environment trembles are likely to cause contributions to increase. For
example, suppose that in each round, with some probability, a player ran-
domly contributes one more or one less chip than their strategy prescribes
for that round. If most strategies prescribe contributing zero chips, then
the associated trembles will consist of positive deviations in terms of chips.
With four times as many opportunities to contribute in the dynamic setting,
trembles alone may cause group contributions to be higher in the dynamic
than in the static setting.
Indeed the conditional frequencies reported in Tables 4, 7 and 9 give
support to the notion that trembles may play an important role in all three
dynamic games. Independent of the treatment, when G−i=0 ,a na v e r a g e
of around 10—15% of subjects contribute something in every round.32 If
contributions are made any time there is an opportunity to give, then con-
tributions may be larger in the dynamic than in the static game. Thus,
although the conditional contribution frequencies indicate that behavior is
sensitive to feedback, persistent mistakes may swamp any eﬀect such diﬀer-
ences may have on aggregate contributions.
While our experimental design follows Marx and Matthews very closely,
the zero contribution equilibrium prediction may enhance the role played by
trembles; by contrast, if all equilibria were interior, trembles might lie on
either side of an equilibrium and thus play a more diminished role.33 Future
studies of dynamic versus static contribution games may therefore beneﬁt
from examining environments where all equilibria are interior equilibria.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Most fund-raising drives do not preclude individuals from making more than
one contribution. Indeed, most fund-raisers repeatedly appeal for contribu-
tions from the same pool of donors and provide frequently updated infor-
32In the feedback treatments (Tables 4 and 7) there is a slight decrease in this frequency
over the course of a game.
33See Laury and Holt (forthcoming) for a review of the experimental investigations of
contributions in static games when there is an interior Nash equilibrium.
25mation on the level of contributions received. Schelling hypothesized that
players might give more in the dynamic contribution game because the mul-
tiple opportunities to give allows players to make smaller contributions and
observe the decisions of others before making any further contributions. Ef-
fectively, the cost of cooperation is lowered. Marx and Matthews (2000)
go further and show that in dynamic voluntary contribution games a posi-
tive completion beneﬁt is required for there to exist equilibria where players
complete funding of the project. Depending on the size of the completion
beneﬁt, these equilibria may not exist in a static (one-round) version of the
same contribution game, and in the case where the completion beneﬁti s
zero, the unique equilibrium of both the dynamic and static games is for no
individual to contribute.
In conducting both static and dynamic public good game experiments
we ﬁnd that contributions are indeed larger in the dynamic game than in the
static game, and that in the dynamic game some groups manage to success-
fully complete funding of the project. These results are of interest to both
practitioners and theorists. While in the presence of a completion beneﬁt
the eﬀect of dynamic play is consistent with both Schelling and Marx and
Matthews, that is not the case absent a completion beneﬁt. Despite some
evidence of a completion-beneﬁte ﬀect, we ﬁnd that this discrete increase in
payoﬀsd o e sn o tp l a yt h ec r i t i c a lr o l et h a ti td o e si nt h et h e o r yo fM a r xa n d
Matthews. In particular, contributions in the dynamic game were always
greater than contributions in the static game, regardless of whether there
was or was not a positive completion beneﬁt. Furthermore the increase
in contributions from the static to dynamic games did not depend on the
completion beneﬁt.
The evidence in support of the completion beneﬁth y p o t h e s i si sa l s o
weak when examining the conditional contribution data. While subjects in
the dynamic games are clearly conditioning their decisions on the group’s
total contribution when feedback is given, this eﬀect is the same whether
or not there is a completion beneﬁt, suggesting that the small-price-of-trust
is what is driving the larger contributions in the dynamic games. However,
in contrast to the ‘small-price-of-trust’ prediction, we do not ﬁnd that ﬁrst-
round contribution levels in the dynamic, b =0treatment without feedback
diﬀer from those observed in the dynamic, b =0treatment with feedback.
While overall contributions in the dynamic treatment without feedback do
not diﬀer from the dynamic treatment with feedback, they are signiﬁcantly
larger than in the static, b =0game. Thus, in contrast to the individ-
ual contribution frequencies, the average contribution data suggest that the
‘small-price-of-trust’ hypothesis is not what is driving the increase in con-
26tributions between the static and dynamic game. Of course, there may be
other parameterizations of the voluntary contribution game in which a pos-
itive completion beneﬁt and feedback play a greater role. However, for the
parameterization we consider, the best predictor of whether contributions
would be greater is that the game is dynamic rather than static.
We conjecture that the key to understanding the diﬀerence between the
static and the dynamic games may lie in explaining the persistent, posi-
tive contributions by 10—15% of subjects when there has been no change in
contributions to the group total by other members of the group. Such con-
tributions lead to larger aggregate contributions in the dynamic game with
its multiple periods of giving as compared with the static game. To better
understand what causes dynamic play to increase contributions it may be of
interest to examine an environment where there are interior equilibria. We
leave an exploration of such an environment to future research.
27Appendix: Instructions Used in the Experiment
The instructions used in the dynamic with completion beneﬁt treatment
(with feedback) are reprinted below. Instructions for the other treatments
are similar.
WELCOME
This is an experiment in group and individual decision making. Please
do not talk with one another for the duration of the experiment. If you have
any questions, please raise your hand.
In this experiment you will participate in 15 sequences. At the start of
each sequence everyone is randomly assigned to a group of 3 individuals.
You will not be matched with any member of your group twice in a row.
The 2 other members of your group will never know your identity nor will
you know their identity. All decisions you make in this experiment are
anonymous.
Each sequence consists of four rounds. You will be matched with the
same two people for all four rounds of a sequence. At the beginning of a
sequence each group member will get 6 ‘chips’ in his or her private account.
In every round each of you must decide how many of your chips you want
to contribute to the group account. Chips not contributed to the group
account remain in your private account. At the beginning of each round you
will be told how many chips remain in your private account and how many
chips are in the group account. The number of chips in the group account
equals the sum of chips contributed by you and the other 2 group members
in all previous rounds of the sequence. All members of your group will see
the number of chips in the group account on their computer screens, but no
member of your group will know how many of the chips in the group account
came from anyone other than him/herself. After each round, please record
the number of chips remaining in your private account and the chips in the
group account under the appropriate headings on your record sheet.
Your earnings from each sequence will be determined after the four
rounds of decisions. Your payment depends on the number of chips re-
maining in your private account, and the total number of chips you and the
other group members have contributed to the group account at the end of
the four rounds. For each chip remaining in your private account at the end
of round 4 you earn 10 cents. For each chip in the group account, up to 11
chips, you and each member of your group will receive 5 cents. If the group
account contains 12 or more chips you and each member of your group will
28receive a ﬁxed payment of 70 cents from the group account. Your total pay-
oﬀ for each sequence is the sum of your earnings from the private and the
group account, and will be indicated on your computer screen. Please record
this number on your record sheet. Earnings from the group account depend
only on the total number of chips in that account. It does not depend upon
how many chips you contributed to the account.
We have attached a simple payoﬀ table to make it easy for you to cal-
culate your total earnings from the group and private accounts. The rows
of the table indicate the total contribution to the group account by you
and the other members of your group. Since each of you can contribute a
maximum of 6 chips any number between 0 and 18 chips can be contributed
to the group account. The columns indicate your total contribution to the
group account. For every chip contributed to the group account you will
have one less chip in your private account. The bottom of the table shows
the number of chips remaining in your private account. Suppose you have
contributed 3 chips to the group account and that the total number of chips
in the group account is 6. Finding the appropriate column and row we see
that your payoﬀ would be 60. Now if you look along the gray diagonal, you
can see how your payoﬀ changes as you change your contribution holding
the contribution by others unchanged. For example, your payoﬀ would be
55 if you increased your contribution by one and brought the total group
contribution to 7. On the other hand your payoﬀ would increase to 65 if
you decreased your contribution by one and reduced the total to 5. Note
that when you increase your contribution by 1 chip you increase the pay-
oﬀs of each of the other group members by 5, and when you decrease your
c o n t r i b u t i o nb y1c h i py o ud e c r e a s et h ep a y o ﬀs of each of the other group
members by 5. As a second example, suppose you contribute 2 chips and
the total group contribution is 11 then your payoﬀ is 95. Looking along the
diagonal we see that your payoﬀ would increase to 100 if you increased your
contribution by 1 chip, holding the contribution by others constant. Once
the total contribution to the group account passes 12 chips, any additional
chips in the group account will not increase your return from the account.
This is indicated by the horizontal dotted line.
Your earnings from the experiment are the sum of the earnings from all
15 sequences plus a $5 show up fee. As we go along please report the sum of
your earnings in the cumulative earnings column on your record sheet. At
the end of the experiment you will be asked to come to the side room where
y o uw i l lb ep a i di np r i v a t e .
ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS BEFORE WE BEGIN?
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